

REMARKS

Claims 1-21 are pending in the present application. In the present Office Action, claims 1-5, 10, 18, 20, and 21 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by *La Porta et al.* (US 6,041,103); claims 1-6, 10, and 18-21 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Lung et al.* (US 6,292,549) in view of *La Porta et al.*; claims 7-9 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Lung et al.* and *La Porta et al.* in view of *Yamadera et al.* (US 5,444,477); and claims 11-17 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Yamadera et al.* in view of *Lung et al.*

The rejection of claims 1-5, 10, 18, 20, and 21 over *La Porta et al.* is respectfully traversed, because *La Porta et al.* fails to disclose the features recited in the claims. For example, independent claim 1, recites:

**receiving a request to forward calls directed to a first destination to a second destination; and
contacting the second destination to obtain an approval for forwarding calls to the second destination; and**

independent claim 18 recites:

**a switch for directing calls intended for a first destination to a second destination when call forwarding is activated; and
approval logic coupled to the switch for contacting the second destination to obtain approval for directing of the calls before call forwarding is activated.**

By contrast, *La Porta et al.* is directed to a method and apparatus for interactive call identification of a call to a called party 200, wherein identifying messages, either text or voice, can be entered on a call-by call basis by a calling party 100 to provide information regarding the call to enable the called party 200 to screen the incoming call (Abstract and Fig. 1). In *La Porta*

et al., the called party 200 subscribes to the message transfer service, wherein when the call is placed to the called party 200, the call is routed to a special server 120, which prompts the calling party 100 for their message, and delivers the voice or text message to the called party 200, who can accept, reject or forward the call from the calling party 100 (Figs. 3-4 and col. 5:1-32).

The present Office Action, at page 2, asserts that:

La Porta et al teach ... receiving by the special server 120 (first destination) a request from a caller 100 who dials the number of the called party to forward calls directed to a first destination (special server 120) to a second destination (called party 200) (Figs 3-4 and col 5, ln 1-21);

However, the call that is placed to the called party 200 in *La Porta et al.* is not a request to forward calls from the special server 120 to the called party 200, but rather is merely used for establishment of a connection to the called party 200. In the words, in *La Porta et al.* the call from the calling party 100 is directed to the called party 200 and **not** to the special server 120. Accordingly, the special server 120 cannot constitute the claimed first destination, because calls are not directed to the special server 120, but rather the called party 200. Thus, the call from the calling party 100 to the called party 200 does not disclose “a request to forward calls directed to a first destination to a second destination” nor “directing calls intended for a first destination to a second destination when call forwarding is activated.”

It is further asserted in the present Office Action, at page 2, that:

first destination (special server 120) contacting the second destination (called party 200) to obtain an approval for forwarding calls to the called party 200 (second destination) (Figs 3-4 and col 5, ln 1-21).

As noted above, however, the special server 120 cannot constitute the claimed first destination, because calls are not directed to the special server 120, but rather the called party 200.

Moreover, in *La Porta et al.* the special server 120 prompts the calling party 100 for their message, and delivers the voice or text message to the called party 200, who then can accept, or reject the call from the calling party 100, or **forward the call** from the calling party 100 to a **forwarding point**. Specifically, col. 5:15-17 of *La Porta et al.* states that “[a]lternatively, the called party 200 may forward the call, where the special server 120 completes the call to the forwarding point, and then bridges the connections” (Fig. 4, step 445, 460, and col. 5:15-17).

Accordingly, the only call forwarding disclosed in *La Porta et al.* is with respect to forwarding of the call from the calling party 100 to the forwarding point. However, *La Porta et al.* fails to disclose contacting the forwarding point to obtain an approval for forwarding of the call to the called party 200 to the forwarding point. Therefore, the special server 120 prompting the calling party 100 for their message, and delivering the voice or text message to the called party 200, who then can accept, or reject, or forward the call from the calling party 100, fails to disclose “contacting the second destination to obtain an approval for forwarding calls to the second destination” and “approval logic coupled to the switch for contacting the second destination to obtain approval for directing of the calls before call forwarding is activated.”

The rejection of claims 1-6, 10, and 18-21 over *Lung et al.* in view of *La Porta et al.* also is respectfully traversed, because *Lung et al.*, alone or in combination with *La Porta et al.*, fails to teach or suggest the features, as noted above, recited in independent claims 1 and 18. The present Office Action, at page 4, correctly admits that “*Lung et al.* do not explicitly teach the method of contacting the second destination to obtain an approval for forwarding calls to the second destination.” The present Office Action attempts to cure such deficiencies in *Lung et al.* by relying on *La Porta et al.* for the supposed disclosure of the contacting step and the approval logic. However, as argued above, *La Porta et al.* is deficient in this respect.

Additionally, the rejection of claims 11-17 over *Yamadera et al.* in view of *Lung et al.* is respectfully traversed, because *Yamadera et al.*, alone or in combination with *Lung et al.*, fails to teach or suggest the features recited in the claims. For example, independent claim 11 recites:

receiving a request to direct the video communication session to the second computer system;
sending a communication to the second computer system to obtain approval of the request.

By contrast, *Yamadera et al.* is directed to video telephone system that includes a master video telephone terminal (secretary terminal) 101 connected to a communication network 20 and slave video telephone terminals (executive terminals) 102-105 connected to the master video telephone terminal 101. The master video telephone terminal 101 can transfer a call from remote terminals 601-604 to the slave video telephone terminals 102-105. Abstract, and Fig. 3.

The present Office Action, at page 7, correctly acknowledges that “Yamadera et al do not explicitly teach the method of sending a communication to the second computer system to obtain approval of the request.” The present Office Action then goes on to argue that “Lung et al suggest the method of sending a communication to the second computer system to inform the second computer system user that he or she is being called from a calling party over the video telephone line (col. 5, ln. 36-61)” and “that it would have been obvious ... to modify ... Yamadera et al to include ... asking for approval before redirecting the call to provide the called party more control in handling the calls.”

The present Office Action, however, is apparently mis-citing or mis-quoting from *Lung et al.*, as col. 5:36-61 of *Lung et al.* disclose functions performed by a signal process 200 and which are not relevant to “sending a communication to the second computer system to obtain approval of the request,” as recited in independent claim 11. Assuming that the present Office Action is

referring to col. 5:36-61 of *Yamadera et al.*, the cited portions in *Yamadera et al.* merely disclose that a secretary that uses the secretary terminal 101 can place on hold a line between the secretary terminal 101 and the remote terminal A 601, if the secretary judges it is necessary connect the terminal 102 of an executive A with the user of the remote terminal A 601 (col. 5:36-55), and that the secretary then informs the executive A that he or she is being called from the remote terminal A 601 over a video telephone line and then connects the call from the remote terminal A 601 with the terminal 102 of the executive A (col. 5:56-61).

However, in *Yamadera et al.* the secretary does not send a communication to the executive A to obtain approval of a request to connect the call from the remote terminal A 601 with the terminal 102 of the executive A, but rather the secretary judges if it is necessary to make the connection, and if so connects the call. Accordingly, *Yamadera et al.*, as correctly acknowledged in the present Office Action, fails to teach or suggest "sending a communication to the second computer system to obtain approval of the request."

Moreover, in view of the fact that *Yamadera et al.* discloses that the secretary judges if it is necessary to make the connection, without contacting the executive A for approval, one of ordinary skill in the art would find no motivation "to modify ... *Yamadera et al.* to include ... asking for approval before redirecting the call," as asserted in the present Office Action.


Dependent claims 2-10, 12-17, and 19-21 are allowable over the applied references on their own merits and for at least the reasons as argued above with respect to their independent claims.

Therefore, the above response overcomes the rejections of record, placing the present application in condition for allowance. Favorable consideration is respectfully requested. If any unresolved issues remain, it is respectfully requested that the Examiner telephone the undersigned attorney at 703-425-8501 so that such issues may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

Respectfully Submitted,

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